We propose a method of antimonopoly regulation in a day-ahead power market with locational marginal pricing which forms economic incentives for a producer, operating a portfolio of generating units, to submit an offer indicating its true cost and faithful values of technical parameters, entering generating units' constraints. The uncertainty faced by regulator when applying the method affects neither nodal output/consumption volumes nor locational marginal prices but manifests itself in overall uplift/downlift for the market, which may be allocated among the other market players in a way preserving the price signals produced by the market.
2 distortion relative to the ones obtained in the case of perfectly competitive producer's offer reflecting short-run marginal cost of power output and actual values of technical parameters. Thus, it is important to design antimonopoly measures that minimize effect on market prices and volumes from error in regulator's estimate of producer power output expenses as well as technical parameters of its generating units.
It is well-known that producer, able to perfectly price discriminate consumers, sells the same amount of goods as it does in the case of it being a price-taker and captures all the market surplus. Thus, it may prove to be beneficial for the market to create an economic environment where producer with market power is able to perfectly price discriminate but is deprived of a proper share of market surplus intended for the other market players.
That approach (embedded in the form of vesting contract) was developed in [20] , [21] for the case of a firm with market power operating single generating unit. The proposed antimonopoly regulation method introduces special pricing principle for the firm which forms economic incentives for it to offer power at the marginal cost (i.e., behave as if the generator had not had market power at all) under the assumption that actual technical parameters of the firm's generating unit are known to regulator. If the firm behaves rationally (i.e., maximizes its profit), the method shields the market output/consumption volumes from the error in regulator's estimate of the firm's true short-run marginal cost. Thus, the error doesn't affect the output/consumption volumes but manifests itself in the final prices through an overall uplift/downlift for the market, which implies redistribution of market surplus without affecting the total market surplus.
In the present paper we extend the method further to a profit maximizing firm with market power, operating portfolio of generating units located in different nodes, for the case of electricity market with locational (nodal) marginal pricing and remove the assumption that regulator has full information on the technical parameters of the firm's generating units. Instead of utilizing vesting contract as in [20] , [21] , it is proposed to apply special pricing algorithm for a producer with market power. We show that the error in regulator's estimate appears only in uplift/downlift for the market affecting neither output/consumption volumes of all the market players nor the locational marginal prices in the power system. If the associated uplift/downlift for the market is relatively small, it doesn't produce significant incentives for the market players to distort their market bids/offers.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we formulate the profit optimization problem for a price-discriminating producer, sections III-IV provide description of the proposed antimonopoly algorithm, which is further refined for the case of energy only DAM with set unit commitment in section V. Section VI illustrates how the proposed method is related to the perfect price discrimination of the residual demand using the locational marginal prices. We conclude with section VII, while some relevant mathematical derivations are located in Mathematical Appendix.
Since most practical optimization problems in power markets involve continuous objective functions optimized over compact feasible sets, we assume that all maxima stated in the paper are attainable.
II. Perfect price discrimination of the residual demand
Consider wholesale two-settlement electric power market (day-ahead market (DAM) and real-time balancing market) operating on bid-based security constrained economic dispatch principle according to the financially binding offers/bids supplied by wholesale market players.
Let DAM with hourly locational (nodal) marginal pricing be cleared simultaneously for all hours of the next day based on the optimization of the market utility (objective) function U  with optimization variables Z  taking values in Z M and being subject to a set of constraints } { C  involving both constraints in the form of equalities as well as those in the 3 form of weak inequalities. DAM may have either power output/consumption volumes optimized separately from the other relevant products and services (such as ancillary services) or optimized jointly, also unit commitment schedule can be either set prior to DAM or integrated in DAM optimization. Variables Z may include both discrete and continuous variables as it is in the case of DAM simultaneously solving the unit commitment as well as economic dispatch problems. Z M is assumed to be a product of the proper discrete space and Euclidean space. The set } { C  typically includes generating unit constraints, transmission constraints due to the power flow thermal or security limits, balance equations for power at each node, power losses and power flow equations (Kirchhoff laws), etc. The generating unit constraints include minimal/maximal output volumes, ramping rates, fuel constraints, and so on. If DAM also determines the unit commitment schedule, then the generating unit constraints include generator minimal up/down time limits, info on must run statuses, etc. Thus, we consider the fairly general DAM model.
We also assume that the structure of power offers for DAM allows suppliers to specify exactly all the relevant cost components for power output (including power output costs, startup, and no-load costs) as well as parameters entering the generating unit constraints. Thus, generator DAM offer includes both offer cost function and the parameters.
Let's denote as  the set of parameters entering the constraints We will also assume that DAM and real-time balancing market converge and no arbitrage of any kind is possible for a producer between the DAM and real-time market: it is not profitable for the firm to sacrifice (part of) its DAM earnings for (expected) complementary gain in the real-time market and vice-versa. Hence the profit maximization problem for the power producer at the wholesale power market cascades into the consequential solutions of the corresponding problems for the DAM and real-time market.
Consider a profit maximizing firm G , operating a portfolio of generating units (possibly assigned to different nodes of the power system) selling power output directly at the DAM at the locational marginal prices (and applicable side-payments), i.e., not having any physical/financial contracts for power. 
hold. (We note that there is a degree of arbitrariness in that partition of constraints as constraints of the form ) , (
 , however that doesn't affect the conclusions of this section. In section V we impose additional assumptions on the set of constraints and largely remove that arbitrariness).
Denoting as ) (
, we have this set restricted further by
The market utility function can be expressed as
with ) (X O G being the sum of (possibly multi-component) offer cost functions of the firm G generating units, and ) (Y U G being the rest of U  describing the other market players offered/bid power costs at DAM. Although for DAM it is sufficient to have
is usually not known to a power producer due to lack of information about bids/offers of the other market players and/or complexity of the power system, and because real-time markets, which should also accommodate for changes in We assume that DAM outcome, provided by the optimization problem (1) with market utility function of the form (2) with the firm G offering to DAM its true cost and faithful values of technical parameters, is viewed as optimal by the regulator. (In the case of G being natural monopoly that may not be true as typically used natural monopoly price regulation methods set the volume of goods delivered using average cost of production, not marginal 5 cost of production, and hence these regulation methods don't maximize the social welfare function of the market).
Let G B  be the firm G DAM offer including both
. As the (conjectured by G ) profit maximizing DAM offer of a firm with market power may differ from its offer in the case of the perfect competition, let 
, and the system rebalancing might be needed in the real-time market as the firm G will not be able to deliver ) (
. Therefore, to assess the market impact of the solution
the real-time market operation analysis is needed. To circumvent that issue we recall the assumption of no arbitrage between the DAM and real-time market, which for the case in question may be viewed as formally setting very high cost for the firm G for not delivering (being able to deliver) exactly X at the real-time market, so that for a solution with ) (
the expected real-time market penalty for the firm definitely outweighs its 
as the difference between its values at the DAM outcomes with offers Z denotes any of these solutions):
We also assume that 
Note that in RHS of (4) . However, if (4) is trivially satisfied.
As economic goal of a profit maximizing firm G with market power may be misaligned with that of the market, i.e., market utility optimization,
. As a remedy for that problem we propose a special pricing algorithm for the firm G , producing power (and supplying all the applicable products and services), that will match the profit maximization problem of G with DAM utility maximization problem and form economic incentives for the firm to submit an offer 
Equations (3), (4), and (7) imply
Thus, at the point 
, and there exists , which in general case is not available to the firm since bids/offers of the other market players are not known to G at the gate closure time for DAM bid/offer submittal, regardless of whether the firm has full information on ) , , (
is the natural choice among the set of the firm's offers, which maximize the profit function, as no forecasting of the unknown parameters is needed for the firm to compose it.
We emphasize that for our analysis to be valid, the parameter c , which is independent from X and G  , should be also independent from the firm's present offer
as well as its previous DAM offers or any other potentially intentionally distorted information provided by the firm, since the firm G should not be able to influence the value of c for a given day as well as for the future days by adjusting the offer G B  . Otherwise, the firm may find it profitable to submit DAM offer (including the parameters entering the generating units' constraints) which is not maximizing the profit function for the day in question treating c as being independent from G B  but is favorably distorting the value of c for the future time periods.
III. Description of the proposed antimonopoly regulation method
The next questions to deal with are how to realize expression for the firm G revenue in DAM in the form given by (5)  . c. Regulator makes a decision on whether the firm should be subject to antimonopoly regulation in DAM for that day. If the decision is made to apply the regulation, then DAM revenue for G is set to
d. The stated algorithm is known to the firm G well in advance to be taken into account when composing its DAM offer. If the corresponding maximizer of (1) in "a" and/or "b" is not unique, then regulator has to choose the maximizer it finds appropriate. (In practice, the optimization problem is solved numerically, thus producing just one solution if any).
Requiring equality of the firm DAM revenue (5) ), we have the following expression for the parameter c :
It is straightforward to verify that in the case of precise regulator estimate of true G B and if there are multiple maximizers for (1) with different maximizer choices made in "a" and "b", the maximal value of ) , (
depends on the choice of * 0 Z made in "b" but is independent from the regulator's choice for * Z made in "a". Hence, in this case the maximal value of the firm's profit function (6) is not affected by multiplicity of optimal points for (1) in "a" but is influenced by the regulator decision in "b".
Thus, the DAM profit function of G , when it is subject to the proposed antimonopoly regulation mechanism, is given by
The proposed algorithm involves the following actions by regulator: estimate of the firm G true DAM offer and decision on whether to apply the antimonopoly measure. Since complete information required to make them with absolute accuracy is unavailable to regulator, the cases where the firm is under/over regulated and DAM profit it receives differs from that obtained in the case of G submitting at DAM its true offer are inevitable. For many other antimonopoly measures that uncertainty results in distortion of both volumes of goods delivered and the corresponding prices. However, if the problem (1) has unique solution in the case in question and the firm behaves rationally, the proposed method produces DAM outcome (i.e., the maximizer of (1)) as well as locational marginal prices identical to that in the case of the perfect competition and, hence, shields the nodal output/consumption volumes and the locational marginal prices from the market power of G . As uncertainty in estimations of the firm's true costs and values of the technical parameters is still present, it results in the firm selling nodal power volumes at prices different from the corresponding locational marginal prices (and the applicable side-payments), that difference results in the corresponding uplift/downlift, which can be allocated among the other market players in a manner preserving the price signals formed by the market. If relative value of uplift/downlift is small, then it will not produce notable incentives for the market players to adjust their bids/offers accordingly and the final prices will be insignificantly distorted by the error in estimate made by regulator.
The sum of the first two terms on RHS of (9) coincides with the DAM market surplus when the firm G supplies X and the other market players adjust their supply/withdrawal of power to maximize DAM treating X as fixed. Thus, (9) (up to constant terms) coincides with DAM profit received by the firm in the case of perfect price discrimination of the residual 9 demand in all hours of the day. The last two terms on RHS of (9) are independent from Х and do not alter the maximizer of the function (9), but needed to deprive G the share of market surplus intended for the other market players (as forecasted by the regulator).
Thus the proposed method has a clear economic meaning: it models the market state when G is able to perfectly price discriminate the residual demand and provides economic incentives for the firm to submit its true offer to DAM.
Expression (9) . Since the latter surplus is independent from Х , the profit maximization problem of the firm G is equivalent to the optimization of the total market surplus (i.e., the function ) (Z U true ). Thus, the economic interest of the firm at DAM are aligned with that of the market.
We also note, that if G belongs to a group of generating companies having collusive strategies in DAM, then the stated algorithm should be applied treating G as the group of firms. In this case (8) represents total group revenue, which should be further allocated between the individual firms in the group.
IV. Effect of uncertainty in the estimate of the firm's true costs and values of the technical parameters
Utilization of market power by a firm results in distortion of the market surplus obtained by the firm as well as that of the other market players. The latter is caused by two factors: reduction of the market utility function value and surplus redistribution between the firm and the other market players given the (reduced) value of the market utility function. Due to ability of the firm to distort market prices by varying its offer, the same decomposition takes place when the firm's offer is subject to antimonopoly regulation based on the regulator's estimate on the firm's economic and technical aspects of production. In that case the distortion of the players' market surplus results from the error in that estimate.
For comparison we also consider the antimonopoly regulation method implying replacement of the firm's offer by the regulator's estimated offer true G
B
(we will refer to it as "standard" regulation method). It is straightforward to see from (9) that the market surplus of the other market players is the same in both proposed and "standard" regulation methods, provided that the firm subject to proposed antimonopoly regulation method behaves rationally (i.e., indicates its true costs and technical parameters limitations in the DAM offer to maximize its profit given by (9)). However, when the "standard" method is applied both abovementioned factors contribute, while in the case of the proposed regulation method only surplus redistribution occurs.
To compare the profits received by G in both methods for . Thus, the proposed antimonopoly regulation method results in the same distortion of the other market players' market surplus as the "standard" regulation method and potentially higher profit for the firm subject to regulation. However, the proposed method produces incentives for the firm to submit its true offer to the market and -if the firm behaves rationally -locational marginal prices and output volumes for all the market players are unaltered by the market power of the firm. If the resulting uplift/downlift for the market is insignificant for market players to adjust their bids/offers, the proposed method protects the market outcome (and, hence, the price signals) from being distorted by the market power of the firm.
V. Special case: energy only DAM with fixed unit commitment schedule
In the previous section we developed the market power mitigation method in quite general setting with parameters of the generating units entering not only the generating units' constraints but possibly also the other constraints. That occurs, for example, in the cases of DAM jointly optimizing both power output and provision of ancillary services or DAM simultaneously solving both unit commitment and economic dispatch problems. 
